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“Arising Under” Jurisdiction in the Federalism 
Renaissance: Verizon Maryland Inc. v. Public Service 
Commission of Maryland1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, the Republican Congress and the 
Rehnquist Court have combined to restore the constitutional 
understanding and stature of federalism. From the Court contracting 
federal jurisdiction to the Congress expanding the use of state 
regulatory agencies to federal schemes, it seems that both institutions 
have sought to fuse the formerly split “atom of sovereignty”:2 states 
have ever increasing power and autonomy in the federalism 
renaissance. 
To protect both state and federal sovereignty, Congress has 
increasingly relied on a novel scheme in which the primary regulating 
law is federal, but state agencies are charged with its interpretation 
and implementation.3 Thus, state sovereignty is protected, but 
federal standards are implemented. Such schemes have resulted from 
years of negotiation and serious compromise between the 
 
 1. While this Note was in the final stages of publication, the Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Verizon Maryland v. Public Service Commission of Maryland, 122 S. Ct. 1753 
(2002). Consistent with the policy articulated in this Note, the Supreme Court found that the 
federal district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994). 
 2. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“Federalism was our Nation’s own discovery. The Framers split the atom of 
sovereignty.”). 
 3. For years, Congress has been innovative in its attempt to allocate power between 
state and federal government. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Regulation, Deregulation, 
Federalism, and Administrative Law: Agency Power to Preempt State Regulation, 46 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 607, 643 (1985) (“Congress is not limited to a choice between allocating all power to 
regulate an area of conduct to state or federal agencies. It can combine federal and state 
regulatory power through any form of cooperative or creative federalism it finds appropriate to 
a particular field of regulation.”). One scholar concisely detailed four benefits of cooperative 
federalism schemes: 
Traditionally, cooperative federalism programs have four basic purposes. First, they 
respect long-standing state interests and autonomy. Second, they facilitate local 
participation and greater accountability. Third, they allow for local experimentation 
and interstate competition where appropriate. Finally, they rely on the economy of 
local agencies (rather than creating or expanding a new national bureaucracy). 
Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and Telecommunications Reform, 52 VAND. 
L. REV. 1, 31 (1999). 
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Republicans and the Democrats. Nevertheless, the question remains 
whether states will ever be federally accountable under such 
cooperative federalism schemes. 
The Telecommunications Act of 19964 (“the Telecom Act” or 
“the Act”) represents one such scheme, radically changing the 
telecommunications market by advancing local telecommunication 
market competition.5 Therein, Congress provided a federal 
regulatory scheme that would be implemented and interpreted by 
state public utility commissions.6 However, the stakes regarding 
opening up the telecommunications market are high and are 
therefore fiercely litigated. Despite the fierce litigation, several critical 
questions remain unanswered: Do federal district courts have 
jurisdiction under the Act to review state public utility commission 
decisions? If not, do federal district courts have jurisdiction under 
the general grant of federal question jurisdiction found in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331? If jurisdiction exists, is a state public utility commission 
immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment?7 If the 
 
 4. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 47 U.S.C.) (“the Telecom Act” or “the Act”). 
 5. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-458, at 113 (1996). 
 6. 47 U.S.C. §§ 251–252 (Supp. 1999). 
 7. In a parallel dispute, Mathias v. WorldCom Technologies, Inc., 179 F.3d 566 (7th 
Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 532 U.S. 903 (2001), the court focuses on the critical question of 
whether states waive their sovereign immunity when the state regulatory commissions 
voluntarily agree to regulate local telecommunications under the 1996 Act. 
However, the question of sovereign immunity may only be adjudicated once the federal 
court determines the question of jurisdiction. Just because the sovereign immunity question is 
litigated second does not diminish its importance: sovereign immunity is a controversial and 
significant issue. The Eleventh Amendment immunizes states from suits in federal court: “The 
Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit . . . against one 
of the United States by Citizens of another State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Alden v. Maine, 
527 U.S. 706 (1999), extends this immunization to suits against states in state courts based on 
a federal law cause of action. 
Theorists have interpreted the Eleventh Amendment both broadly and narrowly. 
Narrow interpretivists argue that the language of the Eleventh Amendment is directed at the 
diversity clause of Article III, Section 2, which provides for federal review of “Controversies … 
between a State and Citizens of another State,” as opposed to the federal question clause of 
Article III, Section 2, which provides for federal review of “Cases, in Law and Equity, arising 
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under their Authority.” 
In spite of its limited language, the Supreme Court has expansively interpreted the 
protection of the Eleventh Amendment by viewing it as an affirmative, constitutional limitation 
on the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts for suits against the states. The Court 
explains: “Although the text of the Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article III 
diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, ‘we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to 
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commission is immune, may individual state public utility 
commissioners be sued for prospective injunctive relief for continued 
violations of federal law under the Ex parte Young doctrine?8 
The federal circuits are deeply splintered on nearly all issues. In 
Verizon Maryland Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland, the 
Fourth Circuit found that the federal district court did not have 
 
stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms.’” 
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (quoting Blatchford v. Native Vill. 
of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)). 
States may waive their federal immunity and therefore be subject to suit. Indeed, “if a 
State waives its immunity and consents to suit in federal court, the Eleventh Amendment does 
not bar the action.” Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985). 
However, the notion of constructive waiver—that states can waive sovereign immunity 
without explicitly indicating this waiver—was eliminated by College Savings Bank v. Florida 
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666, 684 (1999). States waive 
immunity “‘only where stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming 
implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.’” Id. 
at 678 (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974)). Voluntarily accepting federal 
funds does not inherently constitute a waiver: the “mere fact that a State participates in a 
program through which the Federal Government provides assistance for the operation by the 
State of a system of public aid is not sufficient to establish consent on the part of the State to 
be sued in the federal courts.” Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673. 
 8. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The primary means by which federal rights are enforced in 
face of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity challenges is Ex parte Young. Under this 
doctrine, state officers may be sued for prospective injunctive relief where there is a continuing 
violation of federal law. In Ex parte Young, the Court held that when state officers violate the 
Constitution or federal laws, their illegal acts are stripped of state authority. The Court 
explained: 
The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional; and if it be so, the use of 
the name of the state to enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of 
complainants is a proceeding without the authority of, and one which does not 
affect, the state in its sovereign or governmental capacity. . . . he is in that case 
stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to 
the consequences of his individual conduct. 
Id. at 159–60. 
The Court has carved out three exceptions to the Ex parte Young doctrine: pendent 
state law claims, federal statutes detailing a comprehensive enforcement mechanism, and cases 
involving essential sovereign concerns, such as quiet title actions. The Mathias case hinged on 
whether the Telecommunications Act of 1996 provided a comprehensive enforcement 
mechanism or whether subjecting state officers to suit would jeopardize an essential state 
concern. 
For a broad overview of the implications of sovereign immunity and the Ex parte Young 
doctrine, see Jake C. Blavat, Wisconsin Bell v. Public Service Commission of Wisconsin: 
Problems in the Telecommunications Act in the New Age of Sovereign Immunity, 2000 WIS. L. 
REV. 1149; Recent Cases, Constitutional Law—State Sovereignty—Seventh Circuit Holds that 
States Waive Sovereign Immunity by Arbitrating Interconnection Agreements Under the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1819 (2001). 
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jurisdiction under subsection 252(e)(6) of the Act,9 that Maryland 
had not waived its sovereign immunity by participating in an 
arbitration scheme devised by the 1996 Telecommunications Act,10 
and that the plaintiff telecommunication carriers may not sue state 
utility commissioners for prospective injunctive relief against 
continuing violations of federal law.11 The Fourth Circuit’s 
jurisdiction determination contrasts with that of the First, Fifth, 
Sixth, and Seventh Circuits.12 The Fourth Circuit’s sovereign 
immunity decision accords with the Sixth Circuit13 but contrasts with 
the Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits.14 Nevertheless, the 
courts are almost unanimous in finding that the Ex parte Young 
doctrine should allow continued suit against state utility 
commissioners.15 
 
 9. Bell Atl. Md., Inc. v. MCI WorldCom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(jurisdiction improper under both § 252(e)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331). 
 10. Id. at 309. 
 11. Id. at 298. 
 12. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 208 F.3d 475, 479–81 (5th Cir. 
2000) (jurisdiction proper under § 252(e)(6)); see also Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. WorldCom Techs., 
Inc., 179 F.3d 566, 570–71 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 1224 (March 5, 2001); 
P.R. Tel. Co. v. Telecomms. Regulatory Bd. of P.R., 189 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(assuming, without deciding, that the state commission interpretations and enforcements of 
agreements are subject to federal court review under subsection 252(e)(6)); GTE N., Inc. v. 
Strand, 209 F.3d 909, 919 (6th Cir. 2000) (jurisdiction proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331). 
 13. Bell Atl. Md., Inc., 240 F.3d at 289–90; Mich. Bell Tel. Co. v. Climax Tel. Co., 202 
F.3d 862, 867 n.2 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e do not base our decision on the reasoning in that 
case because the court reached its decision by applying the constructive waiver doctrine, which 
has since been limited by the Supreme Court in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., [527 U.S. 666 (1999)] . . . .”). 
 14. AT&T Communications v. Bellsouth Telecomms. Inc., 238 F.3d 636, 647 (5th Cir. 
2001) (“[T]he [state utility commission] voluntarily waived its state immunity when it 
accepted the Congressional offer of a gratuity and arbitrated the interconnection dispute in this 
case.”); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Utah, 216 F.3d 929 (10th Cir. 
2000); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Nos. 00-2257, 00-2258, 2001 
WL 1381590, at *16 (3d Cir. Nov. 2, 2001); Ill. Bell, 179 F.3d at 570 (citing MCI 
Telecomms. Corp. v. Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 168 F.3d 315 (7th Cir. 1999), aff’d on reh’g, 
222 F.3d 323 (7th Cir. 2000)). 
 15. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 202 F.3d at 867 (“[T]he case before this court is a 
straightforward Ex parte Young case.”); Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Utah, 216 F.3d at 939 (“[T]he 
instant suit is also a straightforward Ex parte Young case.”); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Ill. Bell 
Tel. Co., 222 F.3d 323, 345 (7th Cir. 2000) (“these suits are ‘straightforward’ Ex parte Young 
cases”); AT&T Communications, 238 F.3d at 647 (“[A] suit such as this one . . . is a ‘straight 
forward’ Ex parte Young case.”); Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, 2001 WL 1281590, at *16; Ill. 
Bell, 179 F.3d at 571. But see Bell Atl. Md., Inc., 240 F.3d at 298 (“[I]n the specific 
circumstances of this case, we conclude that Ex parte Young does not authorize suit against the 
individual members of the Maryland Public Service Commission.”). 
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Given the split in the circuits, the Supreme Court granted a writ 
of certiorari for the Seventh Circuit decision in Mathias v. Worldcom 
Technologies, Inc.16 and for the Fourth Circuit decision in Verizon 
Maryland Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland,17 certifying 
the following questions: 
Whether a state commission’s action relating to the enforcement of 
a previously approved section 252 interconnection agreement is a 
“determination under section 252” and thus is reviewable in 
federal court under 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6).18 
Whether a federal district court has subject-matter jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to determine whether a state public utility 
commission’s order interpreting or enforcing an interconnection 
agreement violates the Telecommunications Act of 1996.19 
Whether a state commission’s acceptance of Congress’ invitation to 
participate in implementing a federal regulatory scheme that 
provides that state commission determinations are reviewable in 
federal court constitutes a waiver of Eleventh Amendment 
immunity.20 
Whether an official capacity action seeking prospective relief against 
state public utility commissioners for alleged ongoing violations of 
federal law in performing federal regulatory functions under the 
federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 can be maintained under 
the Ex parte Young doctrine. 21 
This Note addresses the question of whether the Telecom Act 
provides independent federal question jurisdiction under § 1331. 
This Note finds that under the Rehnquist Court’s interpretation of 
 
 16. 532 U.S. 903 (2001). The change of the case name reflects the change in 
composition of the Illinois Commerce Commission. Richard L. Mathias, the named petitioner, 
was and currently is an Illinois Public Utility Commissioner at the time of the appeal from the 
Seventh Circuit. 
 17. 533 U.S. 928 (2001). The Court consolidated the Verizon case with United States v. 
Public Service Commission of Maryland, which was also granted cert. Id. 
 18. Mathias, 532 U.S. at 903. 
 19. Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Virginia State Corporation Commission at 2, Verizon 
Md. Inc., 122 S. Ct. 1753 (2002), (Nos. 00-1531, 00-1711); see also Verizon Md. Inc., v. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 533 U.S. 928 (2001).  
 20. Mathias, 532 U.S. at 903. 
 21. Id. The Supreme Court granted the motion of the United States to intervene with 
the respondents. Mathias v. WorldCom Techs., Inc., 533 U.S. 968 (2001). 
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federal court jurisdiction, the Court will likely find that federal courts 
have subject matter jurisdiction over the case. This Note contends 
that this result is critical because continued restriction of federal 
court jurisdiction as a structural enhancement of federalism will 
erode federal law uniformity absent adequate protections by state 
courts. 
Part II of this Note reviews the purposes of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the congressionally 
contemplated role of the state utility commissions. Part III 
introduces the procedural posture in the Fourth Circuit 
consideration of Verizon Maryland Inc. v. Public Service Commission 
of Maryland and sets forth the court’s argument for lack of § 1331 
jurisdiction. Part IV analyzes the Rehnquist Court’s federal question 
jurisprudence and the likely impact of restricting federal court power. 
II. BACKGROUND: THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 
The Telecommunications Act of 199622 dramatically altered 
telecommunications by disbanding local monopolies and making 
competition economically feasible.23 Under the prior regime, the 
Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) regulated interstate, 
long-distance telecommunications while state public utility 
commissions regulated intrastate, local telecommunications.24 Local 
service acted as a natural monopoly and was so regulated by the state 
commissions.25 
The Telecom Act overhauled this system by creating competition 
procedures,26 including the requirement that local carriers enter into 
agreements with competitors to allow interconnection and access to 
the local network (i.e., competitors may use the local network to 
compete with the local carriers). The Act mandates that incumbent 
 
 22. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). 
 23. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-458, at 113 (1996). 
 24. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a)–(b) (2002); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 
403–04 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 25. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 371. 
 26. Three primary requirements are imposed on telecommunications carriers: (1) 
competitors may “interconnect” their networks with the local’s existing network and do so at 
rates, terms, and conditions that are “just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory”; (2) competitors 
may lease local network elements at rates, terms, and conditions that are “just, reasonable, and 
nondiscriminatory”; and (3) competitors may buy local retail services at “wholesale rates.” 47 
U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)–(4). 
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local exchange carriers (“incumbents”) share their networks with 
competitors. Reciprocal compensation agreements are an example of 
a competitive arrangement required by the Act—this agreement 
mandates that the carrier whose customer originates a telephone call 
compensates the carrier whose facilities are used to complete the 
call.27 
Section 252 of the Act codifies the framework by which 
incumbents and competitors negotiate interconnection agreements. 
There are three primary steps: (1) incumbents and competitors 
engage in good faith negotiation;28 (2) if unsuccessful, either party 
may request mandatory arbitration by the state commission or, 
should the commission fail to act, by the FCC;29 (3) if unsatisfied 
with the commission’s findings, any “aggrieved” party may seek 
review of the agreement in federal court for compliance with the Act. 
Section 252(e)(6) provides: 
In any case in which a State commission makes a determination 
under this section, any party aggrieved by such determination may 
bring an action in an appropriate Federal district court to 
determine whether the agreement or statement meets the 
requirements of section 251 and this section. 
The Telecom Act strips state courts of jurisdiction to review a 
state commission’s decision to approve or reject an agreement.30 
III. THE CASE BELOW: VERIZON MARYLAND INC. V. PUBLIC 
SERVICE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND 
Acting pursuant to its regulatory authority, the Public Service 
Commission of Maryland (“MPSC”) approved negotiated 
interconnection agreements between the local incumbent, Bell 
Atlantic (predecessor to Verizon Communications, Inc.), and MCI 
 
 27. Id. § 252(b)(5). 
 28. Id. § 252. Negotiated agreements must be approved by the state utility commission 
and only may be approved if they comply with the Act and FCC regulations, do not 
“discriminate[] against a telecommunications carrier not a party to the agreement,” and are 
“consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity.” Id. § 252(e)(2)(A). 
 29. Id. § 252(b). Notably, no state has yet abdicated regulatory authority to the FCC. 
Were the FCC to ct as regulatory under the Act, the FCC proceeding and “any judicial review 
of the [FCC’s] actions [would] be exclusive remedies for a State commission’s failure to act.” 
Id. § 252(e)(6). All FCC final orders are reviewable in the federal courts of appeals. Hobbs 
Administrative Orders Review Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341–2352 (2000). 
 30. 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(4). 
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Worldcom and other prospective competitors. The agreement 
between Bell Atlantic and its competitors provided for the payment 
of reciprocal compensation for local calls, as required by both the Act 
and FCC regulations.31 An dispute then ensued between the parties 
regarding whether the agreement required reciprocal compensation 
for customers’ calls to Internet service providers (“ISPs”) to access 
the Internet.32 The MPSC determined that calls to ISPs were local 
and ordered payment of reciprocal compensation. The FCC then 
ruled that ISP calls were not local, but that the state commissions 
could individually interpret contracts to provide otherwise.33 Bell 
Atlantic again sought review by the MPSC, which once more 
determined that the ISP calls were local. 
Bell Atlantic then sought review of the decision in federal district 
court and named the MPSC, MPSC commissioners in their official 
capacities, and competitors as defendants, invoking jurisdiction 
under 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (the statute in 
which Congress provides federal courts with subject matter 
jurisdiction over disputes “arising under” federal law). Bell Atlantic 
argued that the decision was contrary to federal law in that it violated 
an FCC ruling34 and the Telecom Act itself. The MPSC and 
 
 31. Id. § 251(b)(5); Reciprocal Compensation for Transport and Termination of 
Telecommunications Traffic, 47 C.F.R. § 51.701(a) (2001). 
 32. In the traditional situation, local calls requiring reciprocal compensation are easily 
identified. However, calls to ISPs require a modem to connect to an ISP, and the ISP then 
connects to the selected website anywhere in the world (a connection that is indisputably long 
distance). Because this connection is unbroken, some telecommunication companies argue that 
the call is not local and therefore does not mandate reciprocal compensation. See, e.g., Brief for 
Petitioner Verizon Maryland Inc., Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 122 S. Ct. 
1753 (2002) (Nos. 00-1531, 00-1711). 
 33. Declaratory Ruling, In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 14 F.C.C.R. 3689 (1999), vacated by Bell Atl. Tel. Co. 
v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 34. First Report and Order, In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions 
in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499 (1996) (subsequent history 
omitted); see also Order on Remand and Report and Order, Implementation of the Local 
Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 16 F.C.C.R. 9151, 2001 WL 
455869, at *36–37 (rel. Apr. 27, 2001) (finding that the reciprocal compensation scheme 
does not apply to “access services or services associated with access”), petitions for review 
pending, No. 01-1218 (D.C. Cir.). The FCC argued that state regulatory determinations that 
ISP calls are local and require reciprocal compensation has undermined the goals of the 1996 
Act and “led to classic regulatory arbitrage,” creating a “windfall” for LECs, “distort[ing] the 
development of competitive markets.” Id. at 21, 29, 70; see also Declaratory Ruling, 
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
14 F.C.C.R 3689 (1999), vacated by Bell Atl. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
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commissioners moved to dismiss, arguing immunity under the 
Eleventh Amendment. The district court found that the Eleventh 
Amendment barred the suit against the state, that the Ex parte 
Young doctrine did not apply to the individual commissioners, and 
that the action must therefore be dismissed because the MPSC was 
an indispensable party under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 
19.35 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, adding that 
federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review state 
commission decisions enforcing or interpreting previously approved 
interconnection agreements and that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
buttressed the finding of no jurisdiction.36 The court found that “in 
the final analysis, the State commission determinations under § 252 
involve only approval or rejection of such agreements” and found 
that other determinations (such as enforcement or interpretation) are 
“left for review as specified by State law.”37 The court then rejected § 
1331 jurisdiction, explaining that “in light of the limited grant of 
federal jurisdiction in 47 U.S.C. § 252(e)(6), the exercise of § 1331 
general federal question jurisdiction would ‘flout, or at least 
undermine, congressional intent.’”38 
IV. THE FEDERALIST TRADE-OFF: STATE SOVEREIGNTY OR 
FEDERAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
The stature of federalism has increased greatly in the Rehnquist 
Court. A series of decisions have increased state sovereignty by 
substantively limiting the scope of congressional legislation in 
traditional areas of state sovereignty.39 To do so, the Court relied 
 
 35. Bell Atl. Md., Inc. v. MCI WorldCom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279, 286–87 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(summarizing the district court decision). 
 36. The court held that the doctrine that “lower federal courts are not authorized to 
review final judgments from State court proceedings” should be extended to prohibit “in the 
absence of specific federal authorization” federal court review of orders issued by a “state 
quasi-judicial body, such as the Maryland Public Service Commission.” Bell Atl. Md., Inc., 240 
F.3d at 308 & n.8; see also Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of 
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 
 37. Bell Atl. Md., Inc., 240 F.3d at 301. 
 38. Id. at 307 (quoting Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 812 
(1986)). Judge King dissented but did not reach the question of whether § 1331 
independently grants jurisdiction. Id. at 309–19. 
 39. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (Congress may not 
“commandeer” the states); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that the 
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primarily on the structure or “spirit” of the Tenth Amendment.40 
Not surprisingly, decisions that substantively limit the scope of 
congressional power are controversial. Limiting the scope of federal 
question jurisdiction—as the Fourth Circuit did in Verizon—is a 
more potent, yet effective way to distribute power to the states. 
This section addresses the question of whether limiting the scope 
of federal court jurisdiction is consistent with Supreme Court 
precedent and congressional policy under § 1331. I first review the 
common law framework of federal question jurisdiction. Next, I 
analyze the possible federal question in the Act, evaluating 
federalized contracts, implied private rights of action, and federal 
preemption under the Act. Finally, I examine four potential 
limitations on federal question jurisdiction, concluding that the 
Court will likely find federal preemption under the Act and likely 
find that the FCC ruling supplies arising under jurisdiction. 
A. Arising Under Jurisdiction Historically 
“[I]n our federal system allocations of jurisdiction have been 
carefully wrought to correspond to the realities of power and interest 
and national policy.”41 Unfortunately, this judicial weighing game 
has turned jurisdiction into a tangled web, with little predictability 
for parties.42 The Constitution authorizes federal question 
 
reserved power of the states cuts across all delegated congressional powers and that the Tenth 
Amendment is textual evidence of the constitutional concern for federalism); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that Congress exceeded the scope of its commerce 
clause authority in enacting the Gun-Free School Zones Act); United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down Violence Against Women Act as an intrusion into state police 
powers and as an unconstitutional exercise of commerce power). All of the aforementioned 
cases were decided by a 5-4 split, with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, 
Kennedy, and Thomas in the majority and Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in 
the minority. 
 40. The Tenth Amendment provides, “The powers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 
469 U.S. 528, 585 (1985) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“spirit” of the Tenth Amendment). 
This dissenting approach to the spirit of the Tenth Amendment was subsequently adopted by a 
majority of the Rehnquist court. See supra note 39. 
 41. Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 411 (1959) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
 42. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION 
BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 482 (1969) (“In determining which cases are federal 
question cases, within the statutory grant of jurisdiction, there is a proliferation of theories, but 
the case law cannot be rationalized by any one of them. The subject has spawned a voluminous 
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jurisdiction in Article III, where it states that federal judicial power 
“shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under their Authority . . . .”43 From the earliest 
decisions, the constitutional grant of arising under jurisdiction has 
been construed broadly, extending to all cases where federal issues 
“form[] an ingredient of the original cause.”44 
Section 1331, passed in the aftermath of the Civil War in 1875, 
was symbolic of the dramatic restructuring of federal–state power 
after the war. The language of the statutory federal question grant is 
strikingly similar to that of Article III: “The district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the . . . laws . . . 
of the United States.”45 In spite of the linguistic similarity, statutory 
federal question jurisdiction has always been construed much more 
narrowly than the constitutional grant of federal question 
jurisdiction.46 Yet the courts’ exercise of federal question jurisdiction 
remains one of their most important functions. Federal courts serve 
many policy ends, such as expert interpretation, sympathetic forum, 
uniform interpretation of federal law, and impartiality provided by 
the life and tenure provisions of Article III.47 
The federal question jurisdiction statute provides subject matter 
jurisdiction for two different situations: (1) where there is a federal 
law cause of action (a position first articulated by Justice Holmes)48 
or (2) where there is a state law cause of action that necessarily turns 
on a substantial question of federal law.49 While the Holmes test  
 
 
 
literature. . . .”); 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 3562, at 17–18 (2d ed. 1984) (“The most difficult single problem in determining whether 
federal question jurisdiction exists is deciding when the relation of federal law to a case is such 
that the action may be said to be one ‘arising under’ that law.”); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, 
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 17, at 101 (5th ed. 1994) (“it cannot be said that any clear test 
has yet been developed to determine which cases ‘arise under’”). 
 43. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 44. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824). 
 45. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994). 
 46. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 495 (1983) (“Article III 
‘arising under’ jurisdiction is broader than federal question jurisdiction under § 1331.”). 
 47. See, e.g., Patti Alleva, Prerogative Lost: The Trouble with Statutory Federal Question 
Doctrine After Merrell Dow, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1477, 1495–96 (1991). 
 48. See Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916). 
 49. Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 201 (1921). 
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seems to equate jurisdiction with cause of action, jurisdiction is not 
synonymous with cause of action.50 Professor Patti Alleva explains: 
To automatically equate the legislature’s enforcement objectives 
(i.e., whether a particular right or interest should be enforceable) 
with its forum objectives (i.e., which forum may hear that 
enforcement action) results in a blur of substantive and 
jurisdictional concerns disrespectful of the court’s delegated 
authority under the general federal question statute to determine 
whether federal forum protections are warranted in particular cases 
regardless of their cause of action labels.51 
Thus, the court must first determine the cause of action and then 
evaluate whether it has subject matter jurisdiction under the federal 
question statute. This, however, does not mean that a right of action 
that will likely fail will therefore not meet the jurisdictional 
requirements of § 1331. “For purposes of determining whether 
jurisdiction exists under § 1331(a) . . . , it is not necessary to decide 
whether [the plaintiff’s] alleged cause of action . . . is in fact a cause 
of action ‘on which [the plaintiff] could actually recover.’”52 Rather, 
federal question jurisdiction requires analysis of whether the claim is 
“so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this 
Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a 
federal controversy.”53 
While federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, this does 
not mean that federal courts’ jurisdiction must always be construed 
narrowly. Indeed, “only upon a showing of ‘clear and convincing 
evidence’ of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict 
access to judicial review.”54 
 
 50. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 92 (1998) (finding that the 
Court has never found the existence of a cause of action “jurisdictional” and deciding the case 
before resolving a dispute concerning the existence of an Article III case or controversy). 
 51. Alleva, supra note 47, at 1509–10. 
 52. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 70 (1978) 
(quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)). 
 53. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974). 
 54. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967). Nevertheless, it is important 
to note that due process is not implicated by determining jurisdiction in the instant case 
because if federal question jurisdiction is denied, state court jurisdiction still exists to adjudicate 
the claims. This is bolstered by Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), which provided that states 
are obligated to enforce federal substantive provisions with the same force they would enforce 
state substantive provisions. 
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B. Uncovering the Federal Question in the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 
The Telecom Act was passed with the general understanding that 
if there was a dispute regarding federal policy, the federal courts 
could compel compliance. Even the most thoughtful jurists did not 
question federal jurisdiction under the Act. As Justice Scalia 
observed, “there is no doubt . . . that if the federal courts believe a 
state commission is not regulating in accordance with federal policy 
they may bring it to heel.”55 Yet analysis of the Act leaves many still 
scratching their heads, trying to determine where the federal 
question lies in this critical area of federal regulation. At oral 
argument, one justice reflected, “I’m really left at sea about what is 
the federal question.”56 
Three possible theories provide federal question jurisdiction in 
the Telecom Act: federalized contracts law, implied private rights of 
action, or state breach of contract action that necessarily depends on 
an important FCC interpretation (i.e., federal preemption). Federal 
preemption most likely supplies the best argument that federal courts 
have subject matter jurisdiction over the Verizon dispute. 
1. Federalized contracts law 
In spite of federal common law’s ostensible death in Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,57 federal common law may arguably form 
the basis for federal jurisdiction under the Telecom Act. In many 
instances where there is a strong federal interest, courts have found 
that rights and obligations are determined by common law created 
by the federal courts.58 Such adopted law may simply incorporate 
 
 55. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 378 n.6 (1999). 
 56. Oral Argument at 15, Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 122 S. Ct. 
1753 (2002) (Nos. 00-1531, 00-1711). 
 57. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (The Court determined that “There is no federal general 
common law.”). 
 58. See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979) (concluding 
that the source of law for contractual liens arising from Small Business Administration loan is 
federal but adopting state law as the appropriate federal law because there was no need for 
federal uniformity); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) 
(vesting authority in federal courts to create federal common law of labor-management 
relations under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act). But see United States v. 
Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966) (applying state law rather than devising a federal common law 
standard where an individually negotiated contract is between private party and Small Business 
Administration). 
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state law and vary across the country or may be developed as federal 
common law and be unified across federal courts of appeals. 
Competitor telecommunications companies argue that because 
agreement claims “depend on rights and obligations derived from 
the parties’ interconnection agreement,” the “documents are federal 
contracts that implement federal policy and embody federal 
standards.”59 These contracts are federal for five primary reasons: (1) 
federal law mandates the agreement; (2) parties must enter into 
good-faith negotiations; (3) parties are subject to specific duties that 
are subject to negotiation; (4) agreements must be publicly filed; and 
(5) once entered into, parties have a federal duty to provide service 
“in accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement.”60 
These provisions of the Telecom Act are similar to § 204 of the 
Railway Labor Act, in which disputes over the interpretation of a 
mandatory labor-management agreement were determined to have 
arising under jurisdiction because the contracts were considered 
“federal contracts.”61 The Court found: 
the statute and the federal law which must determine whether the 
contractual arrangements made by the parties are sufficient to 
discharge the mandate of § 204 and are consistent with the Act and 
its purposes. It is federal law which would determine whether a § 
204 contract is valid and enforceable according to its terms. If these 
contracts are to serve this function under § 204, their validity, 
interpretation, and enforceability cannot be left to the laws of the 
many States, for it would be fatal to the goals of the Act if a 
contractual provision contrary to the federal command were 
nevertheless enforced under state law or if a contract were struck 
down even though in furtherance of the federal scheme.62 
Several schemes have previously been found to federalize seemingly 
state-law contract agreements.63 
 
 
 59. Brief for Petitioner Verizon Maryland Inc. at 20, Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n of Md., 122 S. Ct. 1753 (2002) (Nos. 00-1531, 00-1711). 
 60. 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)(D), (c)(3). 
 61. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Cent. Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682, 692, 695–96 (1963). 
 62. Id. at 691–92. 
 63. Norfolk & W. R.R. v. Nemitz, 404 U.S. 37 (1971) (dispute arising out of 
agreement implementing obligations under the Interstate Commerce Act falls under § 1331); 
Am. Sur. Co. v. Schultz, 237 U.S. 159 (1915) (appeal bond provided to satisfy requirements 
of federal law raised federal question). 
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Nevertheless, the reliance on federalized contract law theories 
seems to ignore the historical differences between arising under 
jurisdiction as defined by Article III, Section 2 and as defined 
statutorily under § 1331. While the constitutional grant, as 
interpreted by Osborn v. Bank of the United States,64 allows federal 
jurisdiction wherever federal law is an “original ingredient” in the 
case, the statutory grant requires more: either a specific or implied 
federal statutory cause of action65 or a state cause of action that 
necessarily turns on a substantial question of federal law.66 The mere 
statutory requirement that a contract be formed is an “original 
ingredient” and nothing more. The Act must provide some other 
avenue under which the contract itself is federal, is subject to 
substantive federal requirements or procedures, or provides a private 
cause of action. 
Bell Atlantic also attempts to federalize these 
telecommunications contracts by analogizing the contracts to federal 
tariffs. Bell Atlantic notes that the Telecom Act mandates that 
incumbents negotiate interconnection agreements on demand,67 
include in the agreements “a detailed schedule of itemized 
charges,”68 file approved agreements with state regulatory 
commissions for public inspection,69 offer service at the negotiated 
terms,70 and offer the same arrangement (terms and conditions) to 
all other telecommunication competitors.71 Similarly, in Thurston 
Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd.,72 a common carrier sued 
because a competitor had not paid all the charges required by the 
Interstate Commerce Act.73 Although the lower court characterized 
the charges as a “simple contract-collection action,”74 the Court 
found that where the common carrier’s claim is “predicated on the 
 
 64. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
 65. See Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916). 
 66. Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 201 (1921). 
 67. 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(c)(1), 252(a)(1); see also Brief for Petitioner Verizon Maryland 
Inc. at 19–20, Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 122 S. Ct. 1753 (2002) (Nos. 
00-1531, 00-1711). 
 68. Id. § 252(a)(1); see also Brief for Verizon Md. Inc., at 19–20. 
 69. Id. § 252(h); see also Brief for Verizon Md. Inc., at 19–20. 
 70. Id. § 251(c)(2)(D), (c)(3); see also Brief for Verizon Md. Inc., at 19–20. 
 71. Id. § 252(i); see also Brief for Verizon Md. Inc., at 19–20. 
 72. 460 U.S. 533 (1983). 
 73. Id. at 533. 
 74. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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tariff” that “the parties are held to the responsibilities imposed by 
the federal law, to the exclusion of all other rules of obligation.’”75 
The courts of appeals have generally employed the analogy between 
telecommunication fees and federal tariffs in finding federal question 
jurisdiction under § 203 of the Communications Act of 1934.76 
State commissions rebut this argument by maintaining that these 
tariffs resemble state tariffs as opposed to federal tariffs. They argue 
that because the state public utility commissions broker these 
agreements and fees, the fees are more like state tariffs. This 
conclusion ignores one dispositive fact: the state regulatory 
commissions are the agents of the federal government in the 
Telecom Act. Although the state commission does determine the 
rates, oversee the filing, and regulate many other aspects of the 
interconnection agreements, it does so at the behest of the federal 
government. The FCC has the power to adjudicate such agreements 
if state utility commissioners choose not to regulate. It would be 
entirely inconsistent to argue that the reciprocal compensation fees 
would be state tariffs in those states that choose to regulate but 
federal tariffs in those states that choose not to regulate. Such a 
scenario would lead to a bifurcated scheme in which state regulatory 
commissions could affirmatively deny federal review by simply opting 
into the regulation scheme. 
 
 75. Id. at 535 (quoting Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Rice, 247 U.S. 201, 203 
(1918)); see also Great N. Ry. Co. v. Merchs. Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 290 (1922) (“Every 
question of the construction of a tariff is deemed a question of law; and where the question 
concerns an interstate tariff it is one of federal law.”). Note that both Rice and Thurston Motor 
Lines involved jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1337. However, for purposes of determining 
whether a federal question exists, the statutes are substantially similar. See, e.g., ErieNet, Inc. v. 
Velocity Net, Inc., 156 F.3d 513, 520 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[A]ny action that could be brought in 
federal court under § 1337 could also be brought under § 1331.”). 
 76. Fax Telecommunicaciones Inc. v. AT&T, 138 F.3d 479, 482, 488 (2d Cir. 1998); 
Cahnmann v. Sprint Corp., 133 F.3d 484, 488–89 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 952 
(1998); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., 71 F.3d 1086, 1093–96 (3d Cir. 
1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 815 (1996); W. Union Int’l, Inc. v. Data Dev., Inc., 41 F.3d 
1494, 1496 (11th Cir. 1995); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Graham, 7 F.3d 477, 479–80 (6th 
Cir. 1993); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Garden State Inv. Corp., 981 F.2d 385, 387–88 (8th 
Cir. 1992); see also AT&T Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 222 (1998) (noting 
that the Communication Act’s provisions “are modeled after similar provisions of the Interstate 
Commerce Act . . . and share its goal of preventing unreasonable and discriminatory charges”). 
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2. Implied private right of action 
Barring complete federalization of contracts, the Court could 
simply find an implied private cause of action for telecommunications 
competitors under the Telecom Act. Determining whether there is a 
private cause of action requires analyzing whether Congress intended 
there to be a private right of action: courts presume that absent 
express authorization, private causes of action do not exist.77 The 
current approach dictated in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington78 
provides that “[t]he source of plaintiffs’ rights must be found, if at 
all, in the substantive provisions of the . . . Act which they seek to 
enforce, not in the jurisdictional provision.”79 The touchstone of 
implied private rights of action is now congressional intent. Indeed, 
“the fact that a federal statute has been violated and some person 
harmed does not automatically give rise to a private cause of action 
in favor of that person.”80 
In Cort v. Ash,81 the Court set forth four factors to determine 
whether Congress intended to create a federal private right of action: 
(1) Is the plaintiff a member of the class for whose benefit the statute 
was enacted? (2) Does legislative intent—either explicit or implicit—
indicate intention to create a remedy? (3) Would such a private cause 
of action be consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative 
scheme? (4) “[I]s the cause of action one traditionally relegated to 
state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it 
would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on 
federal law?”82 
 
 
 77. See, e.g., La. Landmarks Soc’y, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 85 F.3d 1119, 1123 
(5th Cir. 1996). This presumption represents a change from historical framework in which 
private causes of action were more liberally construed (i.e., the court would supply all 
customary remedies necessary to effectuate the congressional purpose). See J. I. Case Co. v. 
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). 
 78. 442 U.S. 560 (1979). 
 79. Id. at 577. 
 80. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979). 
 81. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
 82. Id. at 78. This approach is now criticized by some justices as being too expansive. 
See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 189 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[W]e 
effectively overruled the Cort v. Ash analysis in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington . . . converting 
one of its four factors (congressional intent) into the determinative factor, with the other three 
merely indicative of its presence or absence.” (citations omitted).). 
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After years of negotiation and debate over the Act, considerable 
legislative history exists, yet none clearly answers whether the Act 
intended to allow private carriers to sue. The Act states its intent up 
front: “To promote competition and reduce regulation in order to 
secure lower prices and higher quality services for American 
telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment 
of new telecommunications technologies.”83 Congress affirmed this 
in one of its numerous House reports by saying, “[t]he result will be 
lower prices to consumers and businesses, . . . a competitive edge for 
American businesses, . . . [i]ndeed, the enormous benefits to 
American business and consumers from lifting the shackles of 
monopoly regulation . . . .”84 The clearest beneficiary from this 
statute is the American consumer. However, it is possible to argue 
that Bell Atlantic, as a competitor to the Local Exchange Carrier, is 
also a plaintiff that the statute intended to protect from the severe 
disadvantage of monopolies. 
Legislative history is similarly ambiguous as to whether Congress 
intended review. Only one area of the Act provides for federal 
jurisdiction—§ 252(e)(6), which itself limits federal jurisdiction to 
review of a state commission’s approval or rejection of an 
interconnection agreement. The Court has held that where Congress 
expressly provides a particular method of enforcing a substantive 
rule, Congress intends to preclude others.85 Thus, some (including 
the MPSC) argue that this narrow provision for federal jurisdiction is 
structural evidence that Congress intended only state review for all 
other disputes. However, this argument does not fall squarely within 
existing case law. With regards to interpretation of interconnection 
agreements, Congress did not make any explicit or particular method 
of enforcement. Thus, it appears that rather than having a particular 
remedy that would limit jurisdiction, the Act simply remains silent.86 
 
 83. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.  
 84. H.R. Rep. 104-204, at 48 (1996). 
 85. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 93–94, 97 (1981) 
(“The presumption that a remedy was deliberately omitted from a statute is strongest when 
Congress has enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme including an integrated system of 
procedures for enforcement.”). 
 86. MPSC argues that this silence should be interpreted as intent to affirmatively deny 
jurisdiction. MPSC makes a structural argument, comparing two other provisions (§§ 274 and 
207) that explicitly provide private causes of actions. They note, “That Congress expressly 
provided for a private cause of action in these sections is evidence that when Congress wished 
to provide a private remedy, it knew how to do so and did so expressly.” Brief for Respondent 
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Finally, intrastate telecommunications agreements have been 
traditionally relegated to state law: state public utility commissions 
were the exclusive regulators of local telecommunications until 
passage of the Telecom Act. This suggests that the states’ already 
extensive regulatory scheme was the backdrop for the new federal 
requirements. All of these factors combine to suggest that Congress 
did not intend for a private cause of action; therefore, giving due 
consideration to separation of powers, the Court should not imply 
one. 
3. The Telecom Act, FCC interpretation, and federal preemption 
Even if the interconnection agreements are determined to be 
state law contracts, arising under jurisdiction may still exist under the 
Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co. conception of arising under 
jurisdiction: the state law cause of action (breach of contract) 
necessarily depends on a substantial question of federal law87 
(whether federal law mandates reciprocal payment for customer calls 
to ISPs). Thus, the most probable federal question is the MPSC’s 
determination that the calls to ISPs were local.  If the Telecom Act 
or the FCC ruling requires that calls to ISPs be treated as nonlocal, 
then the MPSC’s finding that the calls be treated as local violates 
federal law.88 Under the Supremacy Clause, the federal interpretation 
must prevail. 
The current uncertainties regarding the FCC’s position, given 
that its ruling has been vacated by the D.C. Circuit, makes the 
substantive question regarding the treatment of ISP calls unclear. 
However, whether Bell Atlantic will actually prevail on the question 
of reciprocal compensation is irrelevant to the determination of 
whether federal courts have jurisdiction to review the complaint.89 
These uncertainties may give rise to a federal court staying the 
litigation until the substantive ruling is resolved, but the 
uncertainties do not divest federal courts of jurisdiction. The 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides that federal law—
 
at 16, Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 122 S. Ct. 1753 (2002) (Nos. 00-
1531, 00-1711). Moreover, Congress considered providing a private cause of action in § 257, 
but ultimately the Act passed without such a provision. See S. RPT. NO. 104-23, at 104-05 
(1995). 
 87. See supra note 49. 
 88. See cases cited supra note 34. 
 89. See supra notes 48–52. 
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including the Act and the FCC ruling—prevail over conflicting state 
law.90 To maintain this supremacy, federal courts must have the 
opportunity to review whether a state commission’s decision 
contravenes federal law. 
C. Limitations on Arising Under Jurisdiction 
Exceptions to the general rules of federal jurisdiction tangle the 
web even further. Even where federal question jurisdiction ostensibly 
exists, federal courts impose four limitations that would divest the 
court of subject matter jurisdiction: (1) the Merrell Dow/implied 
right of action exception; (2) the complicated bifurcated scheme 
limitation; (3) the pragmatic “docket control” exemption; and (4) 
the Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine. Each poses a significant 
hurdle to complicated cooperative-federalist arrangements like the 
Telecom Act. 
1. Merrell Dow—Implied statutory cause of action 
If Congress did not intend a private right of action, the Court 
will likely find that Congress also did not intend for Smith-style 
federal question jurisdiction and that expanding the scope of the 
statutory jurisdictional grant would flout congressional intent. The 
Merrell Dow Court held that “the congressional determination that 
there should be no federal remedy for the violation of this federal 
statute is tantamount to a congressional conclusion that the presence 
of a claimed violation of the statute as an element of a state cause of 
action is insufficiently ‘substantial’ to confer federal-question 
jurisdiction.”91 The Fourth Circuit contended that because federal 
review was specifically elucidated in § 252(e)(6), Congress did not 
intend for broader § 1331 jurisdiction. However, Bell Atlantic rebuts 
this by arguing that unlike Merrell Dow, where plaintiffs brought a 
state-law claim for which the standard of care was based on a federal 
statute, in the instant case “the rights to be protected are federal 
rights, arising from federal contracts, to be construed in accordance 
with federal law.”92 The Court, however, will likely find no federal 
 
 90. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2; see, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 
96 n.14 (1983). 
 91. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814 (1986). 
 92. Brief for Petitioner Verizon Maryland Inc at 24 n.8, Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n of Md., 122 S. Ct. 1753 (2002) (Nos. 00-1531, 00-1711). 
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contract;93 therefore, Merrell Dow may act to preclude federal 
question jurisdiction. 
2. Complicated, bifurcated jurisdictional scheme 
Where a congressional statute creates a complicated jurisdictional 
scheme, bifurcated between state and federal governments 
depending on the situation, courts will construe the statute so as to 
eliminate such complications. Thus, in the instant case, just because 
federal law requires parties to enter into contracts does not mean 
that federal law governs those contracts. In Jackson Transit, the 
Court evaluated whether collective-bargaining agreements between 
local governments and their employees were the subject of the 
federal law.94 The Jackson Transit Court noted that “suits to enforce 
contracts contemplated by federal statutes may set forth federal 
claims and that private parties in appropriate cases may sue in federal 
court to enforce contractual rights created by federal statutes.”95 The 
Court evaluated whether Congress intended the contract rights and 
obligations to be “federal in nature.”96 The Court found that 
because these local collective-bargaining arrangements were creatures 
of state (rather than federal) law and because the legislative history 
“evinces no congressional intent to upset” the exemption of these 
localities from federal regulation, these labor contracts were 
considered state law contracts controlled by state law in state 
courts.97 
In Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co.,98 the 
Court opted against a bifurcated scheme and allowed all cases arising 
under the Expedited Funds Availability Act to fall under federal 
question jurisdiction. Justice Ginsburg reasoned that “All . . . claims 
arising out of the same transaction may be brought in a single 
forum—either in federal court . . . or in state court.”99 She noted 
that the alternative—forcing some adjudication to federal court and 
others to state court—“would yield an incoherent jurisdictional 
 
 93. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 94. Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Div. 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union, 457 U.S. 
15 (1982). 
 95. Id. at 22 (1982). 
 96. Id. at 23. 
 97. Id. at 23–24, 29. 
 98. 516 U.S. 264 (1996). 
 99. Id. at 275. 
REED-FIN 9/30/2002 9:33 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
738 
scheme” that is “decidedly inefficient” and that the Court “would 
hesitate to attribute . . . to Congress.”100 
The jurisdictional scheme evolving from the Telecom Act 
appears to be even more complicated than that of Bank One. The 
question of sovereign immunity will make the system increasingly 
complicated because some claims, although proper under 
supplemental jurisdiction, may not be litigated in federal court.101 
Jackson Transit most powerfully supports the contention that the 
Telecom Act did not confer general federal question jurisdiction. 
Telecom Act interconnection agreement disputes do not seem to 
have a state law basis, just as in Jackson Transit. The Supreme Court 
has even noted that Congress has “unquestionably . . . taken the 
regulation of local telecommunications competition away from the 
states.”102 However, the agreement between the telecommunications 
parties voluntarily incorporated federal law, and such federal 
standards were not mandatory. Because parties themselves cannot 
invent arising under jurisdiction, the agreement itself likely did not 
provide original jurisdiction for the district court.103 
3. Docket control: A legitimate limiting factor? 
Do simple contract disputes belong in federal court? Federal 
courts are indisputably overburdened,104 but this may not inherently 
justify denying jurisdiction. As Professor Martin Redish remarked, 
“The federal government cannot shirk its responsibility to assure that 
the federal courts perform their designated role any more than it can 
ignore its other essential obligations.”105 Indeed, in the instances 
 
 100. Id. at 275–76. But see Bank One Chi., 516 U.S. at 279 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The 
law is what the law says, and we should content ourselves with reading it rather than 
psychoanalyzing those who enacted it.”). 
 101. Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); Pennhurst State 
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts 
from hearing pendent state law claims against state officers in federal court). 
 102. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 378 n.6 (1999). 
 103. It remains an open question whether an arbitrated agreement that incorporates 
federal law creates a federal question. 
 104. See, e.g., FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT ON THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND RELATION TO THE STATES 26–28 (1990) (reviewing the increased growth in 
federal court caseload); see also JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG 
RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 21–38, app. A (1995) (reviewing the current 
structure of and recommendations for judicial federalism and detailing current trends and 
projections of federal question caseload). 
 105. Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and 
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where the Supreme Court has considered docket control, it “has 
invariably been guilty of employing . . . the ‘astrological sign’ 
approach to docket control.”106 
The Court continues its narrowed approach to cases that may 
ultimately involve pure state contract law disputes.107 As Justice 
Stevens inquired with respect to the Telecom Act, “[If] [t]he only 
question is, do they have to pay on Tuesday instead of Thursday, and 
that’s governed by some State common law rule . . . . That, you 
would agree, could not be litigated in Federal court?”108 The 
Assistant to the Solicitor General was unable to answer. In Shoshone 
Mining Co. v. Rutter,109 the Court reasoned that “Inasmuch . . . as 
the ‘adverse suit’ to determine the right of possession may not 
involve any question as to the construction or effect of the 
Constitution or laws of the United States, but may present simply a 
question of fact as to . . . the effect of state statutes, it would seem to 
follow that it is not one which necessarily arises under the 
Constitution and laws of the United States.”110 
Some argue that Shoshone was correctly decided because 
[t]he Court was properly concerned with the volume of litigation 
which a contrary decision would have loosed upon federal trial 
courts . . . . The Court, for pragmatic reasons, had refused to 
extend the jurisdiction to a large class of cases which would, in 
most instances, involve no clearly defined federal interest and no 
issue of federal law.111 
 
Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and “The Martian Chronicles,” 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1786 
(1992). 
 106. Id. at 1787. 
 107. The pejorative view of expanding federal jurisdiction is reflected in Justice Scalia’s 
question, “How many of these agreements, negotiated or otherwise, are there Nation-wide? … 
I’m just wondering how many pure contract cases are being dumped into Federal courts by 
your [proposal].” Oral Argument at 5–6, Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub.. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 
122 S. Ct. 1753 (2002) (Nos. 00-1531, 00-1711). 
 108. Oral Argument at 32, Mathias v. WorldCom Techs., Inc., opinion forthcoming 
(Dec. 5, 2001) (No. 00-878). 
 109. 177 U.S. 505 (1900). 
 110. Id. at 509. 
 111. William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement that a Case Arise “Directly” 
Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890, 903 (1967); see also Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal 
“Question” in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157 (1953). But see DAVID P. CURRIE, 
FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL 74 (4th ed. 1999) (“Since both the right and the 
remedy were created by federal law, the fact that certain matters were to be decided as state law 
would decide them does not seem to indicate a lack of federal interest in the case, any more 
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The policy of judicial economy suggests that if a particular 
construction of the statute will dump thousands of cases into the 
federal courts and overburden the system, it should be construed so 
as to limit jurisdiction. But this argument seems based only on 
pragmatism and not legitimate jurisdictional limitations or sound 
jurisprudential theory. Congress has the power to create and limit 
jurisdiction of federal courts. If it intended federal courts to have 
jurisdiction, it does not seem proper to allow the judiciary to deny 
such a conferral of jurisdiction. While intuitively appealing, this 
limiting factor results in a breakdown of the separation of powers 
between the judiciary and Congress. 
4. Rooker-Feldman as a limit on federal question jurisdiction: 
Abstention and state quasi-judicial body decisions 
Federalism, the principle by which both the federal and state 
governments’ sovereignty is protected, comes full circle in the 
Fourth Circuit’s extension of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that parties may not appeal 
adverse state court judgments to a federal district court; Federal 
questions in such decisions must be appealed directly to the Supreme 
Court. The Fourth Circuit argued, “[I]t would violate basic tenets of 
federalism to conclude, in the absence of specific federal 
authorization, that a federal court may review a State quasi-judicial 
body.”112 The Court then noted that “[w]hile strict application of 
the doctrine requires a final judgment from State courts, the federal 
intrusion into State affairs is not any less when the judgment issues 
from a State quasi judicial body.”113 
Both state and federal administrative agencies at times act in a 
judicial capacity. In Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co.,114 the Court 
explained that administrative agencies (in this instance, the Virginia 
State Corporation Commission) at times act judicially: 
A judicial inquiry investigates, declares, and enforces liabilities as 
they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already 
to exist. . . . Legislation, on the other hand, looks to the future and 
 
than a state would be without concern as to the operation of its own courts merely because it 
had incorporated the federal rules.”). 
 112. Bell Atl. Md., Inc. v. MCI WorldCom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279, 308 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 113. Id. 
 114. 211 U.S. 210 (1908). 
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changes existing conditions by making a new rule, to be applied 
thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its power.115 
The critical factor is not the character of the body but rather the 
character of the proceedings.116 In the telecommunications context, 
state regulatory commissions closely resemble a court when 
interpreting interconnection agreements. The commissions subpoena 
witnesses and documents, administer oaths, and exercise power to 
hold parties in contempt of the proceedings. Parties commence the 
actions, conduct discovery, and take part in a trial.117 
Nevertheless, while the Fourth Circuit’s attenuated argument 
regarding this form of abstention does relate to federalism concerns, 
the lower court did not give any compelling reason why the doctrine 
should be extended beyond its current construct: Rooker-Feldman is 
an abstention doctrine that does not extend to decisions of state 
commissions. In City of Chicago v. International College of 
Surgeons,118 the Court found that federal courts do have the 
prerogative to review state administrative action, even if a state-law 
appellate procedure exists. There the Court found that suits to 
obtain “judicial review of state administrative decisions” are 
“generally encompasse[d]” within federal subject matter 
jurisdiction.119 Undoubtedly, where a state court renders a final 
judgment, the appellate procedure should be through 28 U.S.C. § 
1257(a). But where, as here, there is no final judgment by the state, 
district court review of the matter is proper. 
 
 115. Id. at 226. 
 116. D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 477 (1983). The Supreme Court 
has recognized that both the states and the federal government have the power to transfer 
certain adjudicatory functions to administrative agencies so long as there is the availability of 
subsequent judicial review. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929 n.14 (1997) (citing 
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932)). 
 117. See Brief for Respondent, Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 122 S. 
Ct. 1753 (2002) (Nos. 00-1531, 00-1711). These functions are similar to those exercised in 
Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627 (1986), 
where the Court found that the state civil rights commission’s proceedings were “judicial” in 
nature. 
At oral argument for the companion case Mathias, the Court indicated that this will 
likely have implications for any future Ex parte Young determination. The Court alludes that if 
an administrative body is acting in a judicial capacity rather than in an executive or legislative 
capacity, Ex parte Young may have no applicability. Oral Argument at 49–50, Mathias v. 
WorldCom Techs., Inc., opinion forthcoming (Dec. 5, 2001) (No. 00-878). 
 118. 522 U.S. 156 (1997). 
 119. Id. at 169. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
As the spirit of cooperative federalism continues in Congress and 
the spirit of the Tenth Amendment continues in the Court, both 
institutions must be aware of and vigilantly guard federal 
accountability. The danger of forgetting the importance of federal 
accountability is that few would notice or would be outraged by this 
erosion of accountability. This likely apathy would result because the 
decisions would be made on technical issues such as “jurisdiction” 
rather than on the more politically volatile issues such as invoking 
Eleventh Amendment immunity and exempting state officials from 
injunctive relief under the Ex parte Young doctrine. Yet federal 
uniformity and accountability has been an important goal since the 
first decisions of the Supreme Court. As Justice Story described: 
Judges of equal learning and integrity, in different states, might 
differently interpret a statute, or a treaty of the United States, or 
even the constitution itself: If there were no revising authority to 
control these jarring and discordant judgments, and harmonize 
them into uniformity, the laws, the treaties, and the constitution of 
the United States would be different in different states, and might, 
perhaps, never have precisely the same construction, obligation, or 
efficacy, in any two states. The public mischiefs that would attend 
such a state of things would be truly deplorable.120 
Cooperative federalist programs like the Telecom Act necessarily 
result in state-to-state variance and innovation. But some minimal 
federal oversight is critical to the spirit of cooperation. Limiting 
federal jurisdiction has far-reaching consequences on the 
accountability of the states and state programs. In the 105th 
Congress alone, more than thirty-one bills or resolutions were 
proposed with serious federalism considerations.121 Programs ranging 
from environmental regulation122 to insurance regulation123 are being 
handed over to the states while ostensibly imposing federal 
 
 120. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 348 (1816). 
 121. Keith Bea & Eugene Boyd, Federalism Legislation in the 105th Congress: A 
Descriptive Overview, CRS ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS (Sept. 11, 1998). 
 122. See John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. 
REV. 1183, 1197–98 (1995). 
 123. See Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism 
and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 694–98 
(1999). 
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standards.124 Although these innovative programs are made in the 
spirit of cooperation, when combined with the judiciary’s new 
federalist approach to self-jurisdiction stripping, the result is a 
program with little to no federal accountability and little federal 
uniformity.125 Professor Martin Redish observed the limitations of 
this “astrological” approach to subject matter jurisdiction: 
Any system that aims for the highest levels of fairness and efficiency 
must make hard choices. Random or irrational distinctions 
premised on no ground other than the fact that they reduce 
caseloads effectively skew that decisionmaking process by obscuring 
the comparative cost-benefit analysis. Our values and traditions of 
federalism demand a more careful and rational weighing process 
than much of our existing jurisdictional structure evinces.126 
The costs of denying federal jurisdiction in the 1996 
Telecommunications Act and other similar cooperative federalist 
programs would be high. The benefit of increased state sovereignty, 
while a reasonable end, should not be bought at the price of fairness, 
efficiency, and, ultimately, federal uniformity. 
Michelle Reed 
 
 124. See generally Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative 
Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663 (2001). Congress has passed many other cooperative 
federalism arrangements. See, e.g., Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (1994); 
Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j-26 (1994); Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1396–1396v (1994); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k 
(1994); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (1994). 
 125. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 41, at 488 (“The purpose of federal 
question jurisdiction is to promote uniformity in the application of federal law. 
Misunderstanding of federal law is as grave a threat to uniformity as is hostility toward that law, 
and it is a far more likely threat.”). 
 126. Redish, supra note 105, at 1831–32. 
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